Imanuel Kant

Diskutime tek 'Hapësira filozofike' filluar nga PrInCiPiEl, 11 May 2003.

  1. PrInCiPiEl

    PrInCiPiEl Fillestar

    Imanuel Kant

    Imanuel Kant-i


    Këtu shkruani për filosofin e shquar gjerman Imanuel Kant dhe veprimtarinë e tij jetësore.


    PrInCiPiEl
    :cool:
  2. PrInCiPiEl

    PrInCiPiEl Fillestar

    Re: Imanuel Kant

    Kanti kishte riformuluar dallimin tradicional në mes të asaj që është imanente dhe asaj transcedente , duke i vecuar fenomenan dhe gjerat në vetëvehte !

    ...


    Gjeniale !


    @PrInCiPiEl
  3. ruud

    ruud Fillestar

    Re: Imanuel Kant

    kanti tha dhe qe universi ka ekzistuar gjithmone dhe kjo ishte shume gjeniale :confused:
  4. PrInCiPiEl

    PrInCiPiEl Fillestar

    Re: Imanuel Kant

    Fenomena jane se si objektet paraqiten ne mendjen tone te ndergjegjshme.
    Njeriu nuk ka hyrje-mundesi perdorimi , te botes jashta pervojave qe ne I gezojme nepermes ndergjegjes sone , dhe Kanti besonte se ndergjegja ne vetevehte ose mundesia e pervojes se ndergjegjshme , imponojne kondita te caktuara ne menyren-metoden , ne te cilen objektet fenomenale -te jashtezakonshme paraqiten- larjmerohen te ne.


    PS. Amira* ec këndej , kyqu në diskutime /pf/images/graemlins/wink.gif
  5. Hipparchia

    Hipparchia Fillestar

    Re: Imanuel Kant

    Hippy, je jashte teme edhe pse te jap te drejte.

    Edituar per dalje nga tema.
  6. manga

    manga Fillestar

    Re: Imanuel Kant

    .....
  7. ruud

    ruud Fillestar

    Re: Imanuel Kant

    Jashte teme.
  8. ruud

    ruud Fillestar

    Re: Imanuel Kant

    Ja kush eshte Kant-i:

    Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)
    Kant's most original contribution to philosophy is his "Copernican Revolution," that, as he puts it, it is the representation that makes the object possible rather than the object that makes the representation possible. This introduced the human mind as an active originator of experience rather than just a passive recipient of perception. Something like this now seems obvious: the mind could be a tabula rasa, a "blank tablet," no more than a bathtub full of silicon chips could be a digital computer. Perceptual input must be processed, i.e. recognized, or it would just be noise -- "less even than a dream" or "nothing to us," as Kant alternatively puts it.

    But if the mind actively generates perception, this raises the question whether the result has anything to do with the world, or if so, how much. The answer to the question, unusual, ambiguous, or confusing as it would be, made for endless trouble both in Kant's thought and for a posterity trying to figure him out. To the extent that knowledge depends on the structure of the mind and not on the world, knowledge would have no connection to the world and is not even true representation, just a solipsistic or intersubjective fantasy. Kantianism seems threatened with "psychologism," the doctrine that what we know is our own psychology, not external things. Kant did say, consistent with psychologism, that basically we don't know about "things-in-themselves," objects as they exist apart from perception. But at the same time Kant thought he was vindicating both a scientific realism, where science really knows the world, and a moral realism, where there is objective moral obligation, for both of which a connection to external existence is essential. And there were also terribly important features of things-in-themselves that we do have some notion about and that are of fundamental importance to human life, not just morality but what he called the three "Ideas" of reason: God, freedom, and immortality. Kant always believed that the rational structure of the mind reflected the rational structure of the world, even of things-in-themselves -- that the "operating system" of the processor, by modern analogy, matched the operating system of reality. But Kant had no real argument for this -- the "Ideas" of reason just become "postulates" of morality -- and his system leaves it as something unprovable. The paradoxes of Kant's efforts to reconcile his conflicting approaches and requirements made it very difficult for most later philosophers to take the overall system seriously.

    Nevertheless, Kant's theory does all sorts of things that seem appropriate for a non-reductionistic philosophical system and that later philosophy has had trouble doing at all. Kant managed to provide, in phenomenal reality (phaenomena="appearances"), for a sphere for science that was distinct and separate from anything that would relate to morality or religion. The endless confusion and conflict that still results from people trying to figure out whether or how science and religion should fit together is deftly avoided by Kant, who can say, for instance, that God and divine creation cannot be part of any truly scientific theory because both involve "unconditioned" realities, while science can only deal with conditioned realities. In the world, everything affects everything else, but the traditional view, found even in Spinoza, is that God is free of any external causal influences. Similarly, Kant can be a phenomenal determinist with science yet simultaneously allow for free will, and that in a way that will not be entirely explicable to us -- a virtue when the very idea of a rational and purposive free will, and not just arbitrary choices, has involved obscurities that no one has been able to illuminate. Kant's theory prevents psychological explanations for behavior, however illuminating, being used to excuse moral responsibility and accountability. Thus, the tragic childhood of the defendant, however touching and understandable, cannot excuse crimes commited in full knowledge of their significance.

    Kant's approach is also of comparative interest because of the similar ancient Buddhist philosophical distinction between conditioned realities, which mostly means the world of experience, and unconditioned realities ("unconditioned dharmas"), which interestingly include, not only the sphere of salvation, Nirvana, but also space, which of course for Kant was a form imposed a priori on experience by the mind.

    The problems that must be sorted out with Kant are at the same time formidable. Most important is the confusion that results from Kant mixing together two entirely different theories in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781). The first theory is that the fundamental activity of the mind, called "synthesis," is an activity of thought that applies certain concepts to a previously given perceptual datum from experience. It is upon this theory that the Critique of Pure Reason was planned with its fundamental division between the "Transcendental Aesthetic," about the conditions of perception (what Kant called empirical "intuition"), and the "Transcendental Logic," about the conditions of thought. Thus, Kant still says, as late as page 91 of the first edition ("A"), "But since intuition [Anschauung] stands in no need whatsoever of the functions of thought, appearances [Erscheinungen] would none the less present objects to our intuition" (A 90-91, Norman Kemp Smith translation, 1929, St. Martin's, 1965), without, that is, any need for mental synthesis.

    However, right in the middle of his subsequent argument for why cerain concepts would be necessary and known a priori with respect to experience (the "Transcendental Deduction"), Kant realized that "synthesis" would have to produce, not just a structure of thought, but the entire structure of consciousness within which perception also occurs. Thus he says, "What is first given to us is appearance. When combined with consciousness [Bewußtsein], it is called perception [Wahrnehmung]" (A 119-120). It is the structure of consciousness, through synthesis, that turns "appearances" into objects and perceptions, without which they would be nothing. Consequently Kant made synthesis a function of imagination rather than thought, as a bridge between thought and perception, though this creates its own confusions (it still depends on the forms of thought and is still treated in the Logic). This move occurred because Kant hit upon the idea that synthesis produced the unity that we actually find in "apperception," i.e. in the unity of consciousness -- everything I know, think, see, feel, remember, etc. belongs to my consciousness in one temporal stream of experience. Synthesis therefore brings things into consciousness, making it possible for us to subsequently recognize that our consciousness exists and that there are things in it. Hume had described the result as "something betwixt unity and number," since it is paradoxically one thing and many things all at the same time.

    These were all revolutionary ideas, exploring both the logical and the psychological principles on which the complex whole of consciousness could be generated, but they tore up Kant's original plan for his system so much that he was never quite comfortable with them. He then tried to paper over his most daring insights when he came to write both the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics (1783) and the changes that he introduced into the second edition of the Critique itself (1787, "B"). Thus Schopenhauer, who understood the meaning of Kant's change of approach, advised his readers that they would be wasting their time unless they obtained an edition of the Critique that included the whole text from the first edition. It is now standard to include both versions, with the original paginations in the margins.

    The path to resolving the paradoxes of Kant's theory opens up with two basic realizations: (1) Kant always believed that reason connected us directly to things-in-themselves, and (2) Kant's system is not a Cartesian theory of hidden, transcendent objects, but a version of empirical realism, that we are directly acquainted with real objects. Kant's notion that reason connects us directly to things-in-themselves does not allow for speculative metaphysics as practiced by the Rationalists because reason alone does not determine any positive content of knowledge ("Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind," A 51). For that some datum is required. Kant allows that we possess two sources of input that can serve as such a datum, physical sensation and the sense of moral duty. Physical sensation precipitates an application of reason to experience, producing the perception of phenomenal objects. The supreme rational expression of this is science. The sense of moral duty precipitates an application of reason that generates ethics and religion. The supreme rational expression of this is the "Postulates of Practical Reason," the "Ideas" of God, freedom, and immortality which, to Kant, are required as conditions of the the Moral Law.

    The differences between reality as seen in science and reality as seen in morality and religion reveal that there are aspects to existence that are not revealed by either datum alone. The two sources are also unequal in the magnitude and ultimate significance of their content. What science can investigate and know is apparently all but endless, but it still leaves us wondering, "What is it all for?" Morality and religion have a far more limited rational content, returning to many of the same issues over and over again, but such issues happen to include, not just the questions about how to live, but the ultimate questions about the meaning of life and existence ("Life, the Universe and Everything," in the memorable formula of Douglas Adams). That our moral datum does not lead to direct, positive knowledge of things that we are able to conceive, like God, leads Kant to characterize his system as transcendental idealism, that we have a subjective representation of such things, without the real intuition that we have of physical objects. The reality revealed by morality is thus for Kant a matter of faith (Glaube), an inference from the Moral Law which is itself present to us with an inexplicable authority. "Transcendental idealism" is thus profoundly different from other forms of "idealism," like the "subjective idealism" of Berkeley (what Kant called "empirical idealism") or the "objective idealism" of Hegel, both of which offer speculative certainties about the ultimate nature of things, which Kant does not do. The nature of things that we can know about concretely, for Kant, is revealed by science. Hence, Kantian transcendental idealism is equally attended by empirical realism.

    How Kant can be certain that reason connects us directly to things-in-themselves is an question that he cannot answer. All that the Transcendental Deduction aimed at was showing that particular concepts, like causality or substance, are "necessary conditions for the possibility of experience." If successful, the Deduction limits the application of the concepts to experience, which is fine for Kant's philosophy of science, but doesn't help when he turns to morality and the "Postulates of Practical Reason." There his basic, but unjustified, theory of reason emerges. This shortcoming is what was directly addressed and answered by Jakob Fries, whose epistemology thus could save the generality of Kant's theory without falling back, like Hegel, into speculative metaphysics.
  9. ruud

    ruud Fillestar

    Re: Imanuel Kant

    That Kant's theory is one of empirical realism is difficult to understand and easily forgotten. Since phenomena are undoubtedly mental contents, a point repeatedly stressed by Kant, it is natural and easy to infer from this a Cartesian "transcendental realism," according to which "real" objects, which are not mental contents, are things that we do not experience. A transcendental realism clearly contradicts Kant's transcendental idealism, but we can still be left thinking that what we really have is an empirical (subjective) idealism with a kind of transcendental agnosticism -- we don't know transcendent Cartesian objects, but they are the real objects (the Greek ontôs ónta, "beingly beings"). The lack of clear settlement in this area of basic ontology is the most intractable problem in Kant's philosophy.

    The situation, however, is not unique to Kant. Something very similar can be found in Chinese T'ien-t'ai Buddhism (Japanese Tendai), as formulated by the great Chih-i (or Zhiyi, 538-597). There we find the doctrine of the "three truths" of "Emptiness" (neither existence nor non-existence nor both nor neither), "conventional existence," and "the Middle." "Emptiness" is rather like Kantian things-in-themselves where "dialectical illusion" is revealed by the Antinomies (a device similar to that employed by Nagârjuna, c.200 AD); "conventional existence" is empirical realism; and "the Middle" the Buddhist reconciliation of the two -- not a Hegelian "synthesis" because no absolute knowledge is produced to overcome the inconceivablility of Emptiness.

    dhe lexojeni ju lutem se kam harxhuar gjithe kete kohe duke e shkruajtur /pf/images/graemlins/smile.gif

    p.s do sjell vazhdimin me vone
  10. Kordelja

    Kordelja Anëtar aktiv

    Re: Imanuel Kant

    :rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes:

    Bukur fare, ruud vertet u lodhe se shkruari?!Interneti dhe Google do te ta kishte hequr kete mundime, me beso e kam nga eksperienca /pf/images/graemlins/wink.gif .

    Lodhje do kish qene te na i perktheje /pf/images/graemlins/wink.gif .
  11. PrInCiPiEl

    PrInCiPiEl Fillestar

    Re: Imanuel Kant

    Jashte teme.
  12. ruud

    ruud Fillestar

    Re: Imanuel Kant

    o kordele aman o te keqen....me te vertete kete se dija.......dmth kjo eshte kritika qe i kam bere une kant-it ne essay-ne time mbi veprat e tij...mund ta gjieni dhe ne internet ne deshironi......
    me vjen keqpor skam kohe ta perkthej se kam provime plus qe do ishte dhe e veshtire se nuk i di ato termat ne shqip.....

    fasleminderit
  13. Kordelja

    Kordelja Anëtar aktiv

    Re: Imanuel Kant

    ruud, te falenderoj per postimin, sinqerisht je i vetmi qe ke shkruar dicka per temen, sidoqofte gjuha qe ke perdorur. /pf/images/graemlins/smile.gif

    Une i referohem faktit, qe me sa kuptoj e paske studiuar Kant, por meqe postimi eshte ne anglisht, kufizon pjesemarrjen.

    Hippy ka te drejte.

    Nese diskutimet do kufizohen ne zenka pa kurrfare zhvillimi do detyrohem ose t'ju editoj ose ta mbyll temen.

    Vendosni vete.
  14. PrInCiPiEl

    PrInCiPiEl Fillestar

    Re: Imanuel Kant

    Ne vepren "Kritika e mendjes se paster" , me 1781, Kanti kishte riformuluar dallimin tradicional ne mes te asaj qe eshte imanente dhe asaj transcedente , duke i vecuar fenomenan dhe gjerat ne vetvehte !
    Fenomena jane se si objektet paraqiten ne mendjen tone te ndergjegjshme.
    Njeriu nuk ka hyrje-mundesi perdorimi , te botes jashta pervojave qe ne I gezojme nepermes ndergjegjes sone , dhe Kanti besonte se ndergjegja ne vetevehte ose mundesia e pervojes se ndergjegjshme , imponojne kondita te caktuara ne menyren-metoden , ne te cilen objektet fenomenale(te jashtezakonshme) paraqiten(larjmerohen) te ne.
    Nder ato kondita jane edhe format e hapsires dhe kohes dhe format abstrakte te lidhjeve ne mes te ngjarjeve dhe objekteve sikur qe eshte
    koncepti i substances dhe realcioni ne mes te shkakut dhe pasojes.

    Nuk eshte vetem ajo se ne e aplikojme parimin e shkakut dhe pasojes te fenomena , por eshte ajo se ne e aplikojme ne nje menyre te caktuar.


    Kanti besonte se shkenca i shef gjerat ne ate menyre , por ne jo , se ideja e vullnetit te lire kontradikton determinismin.

    Kanti nuk besoi se ishte e mundur qe te provoheshin gjerat rreth 'gjerave ne vetevehte'.
    Nese do te benim nje gje te tille , ne do te benim , ate qe Kanti e quante iluzion dialektik , qe involvon kontradikta ne vet mendjen ,dmth ne mes determinizmit dhe vullnetit te lire.

    Ne Stibiumin e Katert , Kanti shtronte argumente per dhe kunder, megjitheate Kanti besonte se ekzistenca e Zotit , lirise dhe shpirtit NUK MUND TË PËRGËNJESHTROHEJ , NUK MUND TE HEDHEJ POSHTË.

    Keshtu ne vepren "Kritika e mendjes praktike", me 1788 , ai vendos se Ligji i Moralit na ofron neve bazat per te marrur vendime te caktuara rreth objekteve transcedente ,qe mendja teorike nuk mund te bente.
    Keshtu ne besojme ne vullnetin e lire sepse ne DUHET TE BESOJME , nese do te perdornim konceptet morale si pergjegjesia , faji ,lavderimi,
    fajesimi,ndeshkimi etj,, sepse bazuar ne determinizem , ne fakt askush nuk eshte pergjegjes per akcionet(veprimet) e tyre , dhe sqarimet shkencore gjithmone do ti reduktojne njerezit ne krijesa te shkaqeve ne distance si psh. gjenetikes, femijerise,shoqerise, semundjeve etj.

    @Neve
    :cool:
  15. PrInCiPiEl

    PrInCiPiEl Fillestar

    Re: Imanuel Kant

    Kompleksiteti I te kuptuarit te Kantit dhe teorise se tije te REALIZMIT EMPIRIK dhe IDEALIZMIT TRANCENDENTAL qendron ne terminologjine e perdorur dhe ne veshtiresite e bashkrendimit te pjeseve te teorise se tije.

    Dy termat e permendura ; trancendental dhe empirik, jane epistemologjike dhe do te thone:I pavarur nga eksperienca( transcendentale) dhe imanente ne eksperince.

    Realizmi dhe Idealizmi Kantian bashkrenditen ne dallimet dhe veqorite ne mes te fenomenas dhe gjerave ne vetevehte .

    ...

    Ketu eshte interesante te permendim edhe nje dijetar te shquar dhe me influence te jashtezakonshme ne rrjedhat filosofike : Hamid El-Gazaliun , I cili ceshtjen e zgjedhjes se lire dhe vullnetit jo te lire e sqaroi duke deklaruar se njeriu eshte i lire ne ate qe ka dituri dhe se nuk eshte i lire ne ate qe nuk ka dituri !

    Gjeniale!


    @Neve

    -----------------------------------------
    Jam miku më i ngushtë i Isait,birit të Merjemes, si në këtë botë, edhe në tjetrën.
    Muhammedi a.s.
  16. Diavolessa

    Diavolessa Anëtar aktiv

    Re: Imanuel Kant

    KANT: L'IDEALISMO TRASCENDENTALE

    Immanuel Kant formulò una versione meno radicale dell'idealismo, elaborando un'indagine critica sui limiti della conoscenza possibile. Secondo Kant, tutto quel che si può conoscere degli oggetti è il modo del loro apparire nell'esperienza (fenomeno); non è invece possibile conoscere ciò che le cose sono in sé (noumeno). Egli, tuttavia, asserì che i principi fondamentali della conoscenza si fondano sulla struttura della mente del soggetto percipiente piuttosto che sull'esistenza del mondo esterno. All'idealismo "soggettivo" di Berkeley, Kant contrappose pertanto un idealismo trascendentale.
  17. ^_^

    ^_^ Fillestar

    Re: Imanuel Kant

    Gjykimi Reflektues, mund te jete Teknollogjik, i cili gjykon sipas perfundimit, ose Estetik i bazuar ne sensin e te bukures e te matematikes sublime i cili mund te prtfitohet vetem ne raportin midis te fundesise e te pafundesise te vete natyres dhe dinamikes sublime e cila merret vetem ne rastin kur behemi koshiente per impotencen e njeriut karshi natyres.
  18. durrsakja

    durrsakja Fillestar

    Re: Imanuel Kant

    Interesante eshte te lexosh edhe rreth jetes se Kant.
    Nje person qe kurre nuk u largua me shume se disa dhjetra kilomtera nga ku banonte, dha leksione gjeografie....
    Lexues i Rousseau dhe kritik i empricisteve si Hume...


    ...rreth kohes

    Koha nuk ka realitet objektiv: nuk eshte aksident, substance apo lidhje: eshte gjendje subjektive, e nevojshme per natyren e mendjes njerezore, e cila kordinon te gjitha ndjesite ne nje ligj te caktuar dhe eshte intuite e paster.
    Ne kordinojme substancat dhe aksidentet, sipas simultanitetit dhe realizmit, vetem nepermjet konceptit te kohes .

    (shpresoj ta kem pershtatur sakte ne shqip)
  19. miyuki

    miyuki Fillestar

    Re: Imanuel Kant

    Agis toujours de telle sorte que, tu traites l'humanité, aussi bien dans ta personne que celle de toute autre, toujours en même temps comme un fin, jamais simplement comme un moyen

    kjo me siper eshte nje fraze e Kant-it qe do te thote

    Vepro gjithmone ne menyre te atille qe, te trajtosh njerezine, si ne personin tend ashtu dhe ne ate te kujdo tjeter, gjithmone ne te njejten kohe si nje qellim, asnjehere thjesht si ndermjetes (per te arritur kete qellim)

    (na falni per perkthimin qe ndoshta s'eshte egzakt por profesionin s'e kemi perkthyes :wink: )

    Me kete gje Kant thote qe midis njerezve egziston nje mardhenie interesi le ta quajme, ne kuptimin qe, asnjeri s'ben diçka pa pritur diçka tjeter ne shkembim,
    pra thjesht shfrytezimi,
    por ama e rendesishmja eshte qe asnjehere tjetri s'duhet pare thjesht si nje objekt, nje ndermjetes drejt suksesit vetjak,
    me e rendesishmja eshte respekti per tjetrin
    qe per mendimin tim eshte diçka shume e rendesishme
  20. godfather

    godfather Fillestar

    Re: Imanuel Kant

    per vellain tim PRINCIPEI

    [​IMG]

    (patjeter duhet ta kesh pare edhe me pare , po nuk gjeta dot ndonje version te madh)

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